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Abstract 
The paper analyzes the experience of the Central and East European candidate 
countries  with respect to major macro-level changes in the structure of their economy 
relevant for their catching up. More precisely, the production and utilization sides of the 
GDP, as well as the structure of manufacturing industry are focused on.  
The most important development on the production side of the GDP has been 
the substantial reduction of previously over-developed industrial activities on the one 
hand, and the emancipation of service activities, on the other. In the past 11 years the 
candidate countries caught up with countries at the same per capita level of GDP in 
terms of service intensity. Expanding market services have played a crucial role filling 
the void after central planning was abandoned, since efficient market coordination, the 
working of the “invisible hand” could not have developed without them. Relevant input-
output coefficients show some evidence that the impact of  services is deepening, this 
sector is contributing to and determining the production of value added at more stages 
of the production process than before. 
Restructuring within manufacturing shows a wide variation across the candidate 
countries. Good performance in the phase of recovery of output was not necessarily 
associated with large structural shifts. The dominance of labor intensive products in 
manufacturing, however, indicate that productivity catching up will necessitate further 
massive shifts across the sub-sectors in most of the candidate countries. Even if the 
large share of “screwdriver operations” in the framework of multinational networks may 
blur  the picture of manufacturing structures, we can identify that the countries that 
attracted the largest part of FDI managed either to achieve great structural shifts in their 
industry, or to develop sub-sectors with potentially high unit values, or both. 
On the utilization side of the GDP substantial fluctuations took place. The 
expectations, however, that following stabilization and recovery high domestic savings 
rates and relatively high domestic investment ratios would support the evolving real 
convergence process, have been realized only in a few country. Moreover,  in some of 
these economies sizable proportion of the domestic savings was wasted. This mixed 
development emphasizes the importance of utilizing foreign savings, particularly in the 
form of direct investment. The programmed progress of the EU accession process is 
crucial both for increasing the potential volume of foreign savings and to achieve that 
the efficiency gains that were dominating the period of recovery in 1995-1999 continue 
to accompany the accumulation of physical capital. 
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Structural Change and Catching Up: The Experience of the Ten 
Candidate Countries 
 
János Gács  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The transformation of former centrally planned economies since the late 1980s 
was tantamount to perpetual and simultaneous structural shifts in these economies. If 
one were to classify these structural changes based on the factors that triggered them the 
following three main classes could be distinguished:  
• First we should refer to the systemic changes that opened new opportunities for 
the actors in the economy, particularly through liberalization (of economic 
activities in general, including entry to markets, engaging in foreign trading, 
price formation) and the establishment of basic institutions of the market, or 
marketization (including privatization of state owned enterprises). The 
structural changes then were the outcome of the ensuing adjustments to the new 
opportunities and constraints, an endogenous process steered by the emerging 
incentives in the new environment. These incentive structures were assumed to 
be similar to those prevailing in developed market economies; however, by now 
we know that in addition to the traditional market incentives, the transition 
period also offered unique, peculiar incentives. 
• The evolution of the growth process has also left its trace on the structure of the 
economy through the pattern of uneven growth and decline of sectors. The first 
phase of this process was the painful shock of the transformational recession; 
this was followed by the recovery, which gradually transforms to the process of 
real convergence toward the level of developed market economies. 
• Choices and policy decisions by the governments, whether in the form of the 
measures related to the initial macroeconomic stabilization, setting up new 
social safety nets, developing the attitude towards foreign investors, or making 
the crucial choice about the appropriate exchange rate regimes and the dominant 
way of privatization, all had their impact on structural changes. Given that 
many transition economies are new countries (six of the ten candidate countries 
are new states), the establishment of these new states was also an important 
field of state intervention with its far-reaching implication for the structure of 
these economies. 
This paper intends to summarize the experiences of the Central and East 
European candidate countries (CEECs) with respect to major macrolevel changes in the 
structure of their economy relevant for their catching up. More precisely, I focus on the 
production and utilization sides of the GDP, as well as the structure of manufacturing 
industry. 
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 Accordingly, the main question this analysis tries to answer to is whether the 
structural changes the candidate countries experienced recently correspond to what we 
expect from economies that would catch up rapidly. Another issue worth investigating 
is whether we see certain typical forms of development among the ten candidate 
countries that would predict a faster or slower growth in the future. 
One difficulty of this exercise is that theory and empirical experience in general 
do not suggest ideal or confirmed prospective structures at the macro level that were 
indispensable for a fast catching up to the per capita GDP level of the advanced 
industrial economies. A similarity of the economic structures in the candidate countries 
with those in the member countries of the EU, for instance, is clearly advantageous 
only from the point of view of joining the euro area (due to minimizing the probability 
of asymmetric shocks), but that task has not been at the top of the agenda of the CEECs 
so far, not to mention that catching up and fast fulfillment of the euro area criteria may 
contradict each other. (see Dobrinsky 2001, Rosati 2001 and Pelkmans et al. 2000) 
Moreover, in many respects the EU member countries themselves show highly 
heterogeneous structures. 
 A larger structural move from the starting position may in principle testify a 
bolder move away from structures inherited from central planning, so it could be more 
advantageous for catching up. However, it is not necessary that the inherited distortions 
were proportionally reflected in the distorted macrolevel structures: the distortions, 
basically various forms of inefficiencies, could have been embedded in lower level 
structures, such as the structure of industries and the internal setup of enterprises. 
 According to these considerations we have not established a definite common 
framework for this paper in which we would analyze all structural changes and 
emerging structures from the point of view of catching up, but rather decided to 
examine the various structures according to different, although not ad hoc, criteria. In 
the first section of the paper the production side of GDP1 is to be analyzed primarily 
from the point of view of catching up with characteristic macrostructures of advanced 
market economies, more precisely the progress in the emancipation of services. In the 
second section we focus on the structure of manufacturing industry, particularly on the 
‘distance’ of current structures from structures in the past and structures prevailing in 
the current EU member countries. Finally in the third section, in the course of 
investigating the utilization side of the GDP, we will investigate whether the 
developments have followed or should follow the proposition that high savings and 
investment rates are necessary for a fast catching up for the CEECs. 
 Before we start analyzing structural changes in the period of transition, we have 
to emphasize that at the end of the 1980s all the structural features that are to be 
discussed below showed a striking similarity across the countries of Central and East 
Europe. 
• On the production side of GDP, for many decades, the dominating sector was 
the industry, particularly heavy industry. 
                                                 
1
 The production side of GDP here is equivalent with the term  the activity side or supply side of 
GDP used by others. Similarly, the expression utilization side of the GDP is equivalent with 
what others call the demand side of the GDP.  
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• In most of the candidate countries the industrial structure, apart from its bias 
towards heavy industry, reflected the simple division of labor in which the 
Soviet Union provided these countries with energy sources and raw materials in 
exchange for deliveries of manufactured products. 
• In the utilization side of GDP investments were traditionally given high 
priority. Net exports, at least in a large (CMEA-related) part of trade, were 
minimized through a clearing mechanism. 
• Trade showed distinct patterns for the CMEA area and the rest of the world. 
The CMEA area absorbed exports of highly manufactured products, while 
exports to the rest of the world were made up of raw materials, food and 
agricultural products as well as lower-end manufactured products. 
The similarity of these structures across the countries was mainly influenced by 
the ideology of the communist system, its major priorities, as well as its national and 
supranational institutions (see Kornai 1992).  
 
 
2. Production side of the GDP: the progress of services 
 
The most important development in this sphere has been the emancipation of 
services in general and of market services in particular. The communist ideology did 
not consider services an activity that produced new value, an activity that contributed to 
economic growth. The most obvious expression of this preposterous approach was that 
in the Marxist system of national accounts (the so-called Material Product System) 
rendering of market services did not contribute to net output, the so called Net Material 
Product.2 While some market services clearly did not fit the communist ideology and 
central planning (e.g. financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business 
services), even the rest were treated with suspicion, were centrally organized and 
strictly controlled (e.g. wholesale and retail trade, transport and telecommunications). 
The result was the provision of services in a centrally organized form, in insufficient 
volume, with low efficiency, with little attention to demand and with persistent long 
real and virtual queues of customers.3 
 Figure 1 shows a sample of 124 countries in terms of the share of total services 
in the production of GDP and their level of GDP per capita at PPP rates (in natural 
logarithm) in 1988, the year before the wave of political and economic transition 
                                                 
2
 Interestingly, a small part of the output of nonmarket services, however, was accounted for in 
the Net Material Product (see Árvay 1995). 
3
 To name just one example: in 1976-1985, in Hungary and Poland the average number of 
persons waiting for the introduction of a telephone line into their home amounted to 56-57 per 
cent of those who already had a telephone subscription; in the developed market economies this 
indicator was below 5 per cent (see Kornai 1992, p. 235). 
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started in Central and in Eastern Europe. The tendency that with economic 
development the tertiary sector crowds out the other two main sectors from the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of Services in GDP and ln (GDP per capita), 1988
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Figure 2: Share of Services in GDP and ln (GDP per capita), 1999
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Figure 1: Share of Services in GDP and in (GDPper capita), 1988 
Figure 2: Share of Services in GDP d in (GDP per capita), 1999 
      Figure 1: Share of Services in   in (GDP per capita), 1988 
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production of GDP (first predicted by Clark 1940) is confirmed by a cross-sectional 
regression estimation represented by the regressional line on the figure (details of the 
calculation and parameters can be found in Appendix Table 1).4 The line expresses the 
relation that around 15 per cent growth in GDP per capita  leads to 1 percentage point 
growth in the services share of GDP. From the point of view of our subject it is 
important to find that in 1988 all the candidate countries were located in a ‘cloud’ 
distinctly below the main trend of development.  
Figure 2 shows the relevant regression for 1999 calculated for virtually the 
same sample; here the coefficients already show a steeper growth of service shares with 
the development of per capita GDP (10 per cent growth of per capita GDP leads to 1 
percentage point growth in the share of services in GDP). The figure also shows the 
radical move that the CEECs accomplished in 11 years of transition. In 1999 already 
six of the ten candidate countries were above the ‘normal’ level of service intensity 
represented by the regression line of 1999, and all the candidate countries seem to have 
joined the mainstream5. 
 Some skeptics may say that this increase in the contribution of services to GDP 
is simply a reflection of the collapse of industrial output that contributed to the decline 
in total output (i.e. an unchanged or falling volume of services represents a higher share 
in the diminished volume of total output). This statement can be substantiated by the 
coincidence of the increase in the share of services in GDP and the severe decline of 
output in the CEECs, since both took place at the beginning of the 1990s. If, however, 
we look at data for the period 1988-1999, we find that seven of the ten candidate 
countries experienced real service output growth, and in these countries the cumulative 
difference between the real growth of services and total GDP was over 27 per cent.6 
Moreover, in most countries (here the exceptions are Bulgaria and Romania) 
employment in services also showed a – usually modest – increase. 
 There is another qualification to the fast expansion of services, and this is 
related to the registration practices of activities on the one hand and of institutions on 
the other. During the period of central planning, the traditional large socialist industrial 
enterprises had comprised many service activities (transport, maintenance or even 
health and social services). After transition started, these activities, under the emerging 
market pressures and in association with reorganizations related to the process of 
privatization, were split from the mother company and continued in independent firms. 
It was a development similar to, but probably more intense than the emerging pattern of 
outsourcing in the developed market economies in the 1990s. Nevertheless, one would 
                                                 
4
 Although the proposition of Clark and many followers was formulated for the share of 
employment in the three main sectors, due to less reliable data for employment we decided to 
focus on the distribution of GDP. 
5
 As the results presented in Appendix Table 1 show, if we calculate the regressions for a 
sample excluding the transition economies, the 1988 regression line becomes much steeper than 
the regression line based on the full sample. The 1999 lines, however, are already almost 
identical in the two samples.   
 
6
 The available data from WDI (2001) are, however, incomplete and possibly far from being 
fully reliable.   
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expect that in the CEECs the new service enterprises, if they survived, became much 
more efficient than they had been as service units in the original industrial mother 
company.  
 In sum, we may drop the idea that we saw only an illusory development of 
services in the CEECs. 
 One part of the expansion of services was in close relation to unleashed 
consumer sovereignty. Households and consumers in centrally planned economies had 
suffered from the suppressed choice of consumer products and services, so that 
following the first steps of market liberalization, they strongly responded to the new 
opportunities for satisfying their previously unmet demand. At the same time, much of 
the newly founded businesses aimed at contributing to the provision of these services to 
consumers and also at supplying the business sector with services. In 2001, on average 
76 per cent of all entrepreneurships in the seven Central and South European candidate 
countries were active in the service sector. The number of service enterprises was in the 
millions, rather than the hundred thousands.7 
 A number of analysts remarked that employment in the expanding services 
sector was unable to absorb the enormous loss of employment in industry and 
agriculture during the transition.8 While this is a sad fact, one should not be misled by 
assuming that the role of the expanding service sector was simply to replace industry as 
the leading sector of the economy. In fact, one of the primary functions of the emerging 
service sector in the transition economies has been to enable the revival of industrial 
output in the market environment and enhance the strength of industry in an 
environment of fierce international competition. 
 In an economy with gradually evolving competition, growing monetization and 
the successive dominance of horizontal transactions over vertical ones, where 
producers have to seek new markets and face a multiplication of new market 
participants, services become critical for the survival of business. Services have played 
a crucial role filling the void after central planning, the bureaucratic coordination by the 
government, was abandoned, since efficient market coordination, the working of the 
“invisible hand” could not have developed without them. Trade (both wholesale and 
retail), marketing, juridical services, real estate and business services, transport and 
communications, financial intermediation and insurance have all become crucial in 
providing network-like connections between producers as well as between producers 
and consumers, with the possibilities of externalities in their use.9 In fact two countries, 
Poland and Hungary, already showed a pattern that one would ideally expect from this 
rearrangement of the role of industry and services: in both countries, following the 
initial decline in its output, industrial production recovered fast to the pretransition 
level, and in 2000 gross industrial production was 70 per cent and 50 per cent higher in 
the two countries, respectively, than in 1989. 
 In order to illustrate that services not only accounted for a larger part of 
economic activities in the CEECs, but also had a deeper impact by enhancing the 
                                                 
7
 No doubt a large and variable share of these small firms are fictitious ones that are either not 
active or were set up only to make some sort of tax avoidance possible. 
8
 See e.g. Landesmann (2000a) and Vidovic (2000). 
9
 See Rask and Rask (1994) for more information. 
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production and exchange of all other activities, we made some calculations. We used 
the input-output framework to obtain a few coefficients that show the impact of 
domestic market services on the Hungarian economy. The results are presented in 
Table 1. Two kinds of coefficients were calculated, one for the direct use of services, 
and one for the cumulative use, i.e. taking into account the system of intersectoral 
flows. The table shows that in the 1986-1998 period domestic services increasingly 
contributed to the production process not only directly, but also through intersectoral 
connections. Both the coefficients of direct and cumulative use of market services show 
a substantial increase already in the second part of the 1980s, which continues 
throughout the 1990s.  
 
 
 What is interesting is that both coefficients indicate an increasing and deeper 
impact of domestic service activities in the period when the importance of total 
intermediary inputs (both directly and indirectly) shrinks due to the increasing 
openness of the economy (see the second, third and the fifth lines of the table). 
 To put these developments in Hungary into an international perspective, we 
calculated the same indicators for two EU member countries for which comparable 
input-output data were available, namely Denmark and Germany. 
 
 
Table 1 
Coefficients of direct and cumulative use of market services in the Hungarian economy 
                   calculated from input-output tables
 
1986
 
1990
 
1998
 
Direct use of domestic market services 1 0.069 0.128 0.160 
Direct total use of domestic intermediary inputs 2 0.413 0.478 0.355 
Direct total use of imported intermediary inputs 3 0.104 0.092 0.196 
Cumulated use of domestic market services 4 0.358 0.447 0.518 
Cumulated total use of domestic intermediary inputs 5 1.975 1.915 1.551 
1 
 Direct use of domestic market services as intermediary input for the production of one unit of gross output 
2 
 Direct total use of domestic intermediary inputs for the production of one unit of gross output 
3 
 Direct total use of imported intermediary inputs for the production of one unit of gross output 
4  Cumulated use of domestic market services as inputs for the production of one unit of final demand 
5  Cumulated total use of domestic intermediary inputs for the production of one unit of final demand 
Note: The input-output inverse (the source of the cumulative indices) assumes that in the system of  
inter-connected sectors one unit of final demand is produced. This is why the cumulated total use of domestic  
intermediary inputs is large than 1. 
Source: Own calculations from various publications and data base of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office  
Table 1:  Coefficients of direct and cumu ative use of market services 
in the Hungarian economy calculated from input-output tables 
Table 1:  Coefficients of direct and cumulative use of market services 
in the Hungarian economy calculated from input-output tables 
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Figure 3 shows the results, which indicate that in 1998 in Hungary the direct 
contribution of services to total output was comparable to that recorded in Denmark 
and Germany. In terms of the cumulated contribution of services, however, Hungary’s 
lag (particularly against Germany), was still pronounced. 
 
 
 
While in the primary sectoral distribution of GDP, catching up with the market 
economies in general rather than with the EU seems crucial, it is worth looking at how 
the CEEC-10 as a group has been related to the EU-15 in the past 11 years. Table 2 
shows that in terms of this sectoral distribution, the development of the CEEC-10 was 
in harmony with the development in the EU-15.10 As for the homogeneity of the two 
groups, starting from a position in 1988 where, despite the straitjacket of central 
planning, sectoral distribution was more dispersed in the CEECs than in the EU-15, the 
CEEC-10 moved to a point in 1999 where their level of homogeneity is similar to that 
of the EU-15. This is all the more interesting because the dispersion in terms of per 
capita income remained larger in the CEEC-10 than in the EU.  
                                                 
10
 In Table 2 and in all further calculations group averages are arithmetic unweighted averages.  
 
Figure 3: Contribution of domestic market services to total output, direct and and cumulated
(see explanations in Table 1) 
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If one looks at the development of the two major groups of services (see Table 
3), one finds the characteristic, though not counterintuitive feature that measured as 
percent of GDP, nonmarket services (public administration, defense, health, education, 
etc.) were and continue to be at relatively high level in the former communist countries, 
comparable with the level achieved in the EU.11 Consequently, today, as before, most 
of the CEECs’ lag behind the EU-15 can be registered in the field of market services 
rather than in nonmarket services.  
 
                                                 
11
 The relatively high level of nonmarket services in the CEECs can be associated with the 
traditional high priorities of the communist system with respect to health and education. As a 
consequence of these priorities the communist countries generally achieved a relatively higher 
rank in the indicators of human development than in the indicators of economic growth (see 
Gács 2001). 
 
Table 2
Major sectors' share in GDP in EU 15 and CEEC 10 
(unweighted averages)
1988 1999
Average Standard Coeff. of Average Standard Coeff. of 
deviation variation deviation variation
% of GDP % of GDP % % of GDP % of GDP %
EU-15
Agriculture 4.6 2.9 63 2.8 1.7 62
Industry 29.4 2.7 9 25.6 3.8 15
Services 66.0 3.5 5 71.6 4.3 6
CEEC 10
Agriculture 14.6 7.0 48 7.0 4.7 67
Industry 48.5 9.4 19 31.8 5.8 18
Services 36.9 6.7 18 61.2 5.5 9
Memorandum item: GDP per capita at PPP
Average Standard Coeff. of Average Standard Coeff. of 
deviation variation deviation variation
USD USD % USD USD %
EU 15 15817 3151 20 23700 6234 26
CEEC 10 8488 1819 21 9185 3509 38
Source: Own calculations based on WDI (2001)
Table  2:  Major sectors’ share in GDP in EU 15 and CEEC 10 
(unweighted averages) 
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Table 3
Gross Value Added of Services in total Gross Value Added 
                                        in the EU 15 and CEEC 10, percent
(at current prices)
        Market services    Non-market services 
       at current prices        at current prices
1989 1997 1989 1997
Belgium 53.0 56.5 13.1 13.5
Denmark 45.8 47.1 22.6 22.5
Germany 45.3 53.9 13.6 13.3
Greece 39.0 56.9 16.8 12.0
Spain 47.5 51.8 12.5 13.7
France 49.7 51.9 16.2 18.2
Ireland 39.7 41.0 14.4 13.5
Italy 48.5 52.8 13.3 13.4
Luxembourg 55.8 65.9 11.3 12.2
Netherlands 44.3 48.8 20.9 19.7
Austria 47.6 52.3 15.6 14.0
Portugal 43.2 45.7 14.1 16.6
Finland 38.7 41.4 18.6 19.9
Sweden 40.0 43.4 24.9 26.0
United Kingdom 46.9 54.5 15.1 12.4
EU 15 46.9 52.4 15.2 15.1
1990-1993 1999 1990-1993 1999
Bulgaria 42.2 13.1
Czech R. 1990 33.2 42.9 9.6 12.2
Estonia 1993 42.0 47.0 13.6 18.8
Hungary 1991 41.2 44.3 13.9 17.5
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland 1992 27.9 42.8 21.5 17.6
Romania 1990 19.3 39.2 22.4 9.9
Slovakia 1992 39.2 45.2
Slovenia 1990 36.4 39.7 15.5 18.4
CEECs 34.2 42.9 16.1 15.3
CEECs w/o Romania 36.6 43.4 14.8 16.2
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat Yearbook 2001,
 WIIW data base, and Bank of Estonia web site
 Table 3:  Gross Value Added of Services in total Gross Value 
Added in the EU 15 and CEEC 10, percent 
(at current prices) 
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3. Manufacturing production: structural shifts in time and 
space 
 
In 2000, partly due to the emancipation of services, the share of manufacturing 
production in GDP stood at a substantially lower level in the CEECs than before 
transition. Today manufacturing represents about 22 per cent of GDP in the candidate 
countries (a slightly higher share than the average share in the EU-15). Nevertheless it 
has been and will be a crucial sector from the point of view of catching up: it is the 
sector that realizes most exchanges with the rest of the world through foreign trade, and 
it is also the basis for future productivity catching up.12 
 In the 1990s, the manufacturing sector was the most severely hit part of the 
candidate countries as a consequence of the transformational recession: its employment 
now is down by 5 million, or 40 per cent, compared to the employment recorded in 
1989.13 The drastic fall in output leveled out in 1992-1994, and since than we have seen 
a more or less steady recovery. This expansion of output has been based mostly on 
productivity increases, since in all countries, except Hungary, employment in 
manufacturing remains on the decline. This expansion through productivity as well as 
many other indicators evidences a massive restructuring which can have far-reaching 
consequences for the candidate countries’ performance before and after their EU 
accession. How deep was this restructuring in the various CEECs and what kind of time 
pattern did it follow? How does the emerging structure of manufacturing activities in 
the accession countries relate to the structures prevailing in the EU? These are the 
question we attempt to answer below. Due to a lack of data, in this section  we had to 
disregard the Baltic countries in most of the analysis and have focused on the remaining 
seven CEECs. 
 We will analyze the shifts in the sectoral composition of output among the 14 
NACE 2-digit subsectors of manufacturing in 1989-2000. Table 4 and Figure 4 show 
the pattern of rearrangements of subsectoral shares across the manufacturing industries 
(within the distribution of manufacturing gross output)14. We can see that the usual size 
of the shift across industries in the 11 years was 12 to 20 percentage points.  
 
                                                 
12
 Some of the candidate countries, however, realize as high as 30 to 37 per cent  of their exports 
through exports of commercial service activities (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria). 
13
 This comparison is calculated for the seven Central and South European candidate countries 
(the CEEC-7), i.e. without the Baltic states. 
14
 With the rearrangement of manufacturing output some subsectors gain, while others lose 
certain percentage points; the total of percentage points gained and lost are obviously identical.  
This is why Figure 4 is symmetrical and the total gained/lost shares are called “total percentage 
rearranged". 
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distribution of manufacturing output, at constant prices, percentage points 
Food
Textile
Leather
Wood
Paper
Petrol
Chemical
Rubber
Mineral
Metal
Machine
Electrical
Transport
Other
Figure 4: Structural shifts between 1989 and 2000 across 
manufacturing sub-sectors in the distribution of 
man facturing output, at constant prices, perce tage points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Sectoral shifts in manufacturing industries 1989 - 2000, percentage point 
 
(based on constant 1996 price data) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Sectoral shifts in manuf cturing industries 1989 - 2000, percentage point 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
(based on constant [1996] price data) 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
 
Czech R. 
 
 
Hungary 
 
 
Poland 
 
 
Romania 
 
 
Slovakia 
 
 
Slovenia 
 
 
Average 
 
 
DA 
 
 
Food products; beverages and tobacco 
 
 
- 0.4 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
- 10.7 
 
 
- 2.2 
 
 
5.6 
 
 
- 4.2 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
- 1.1 
 
 
DB 
 
 
Textiles and textile products 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
- 2.6 
 
 
- 3.4 
 
 
- 3.3 
 
 
- 0.1 
 
 
- 3.5 
 
 
- 1.9 
 
 
- 2.0 
 
 
DC 
 
 
Leather and leather products 
 
 
- 0.3 
 
 
- 1.6 
 
 
- 0.9 
 
 
- 1.1 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
- 1.1 
 
 
- 1.7 
 
 
- 0.9 
 
 
DD 
 
 
Wood and wood products 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
- 0.3 
 
 
- 0.1 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
- 0.7 
 
 
- 1.0 
 
 
- 1.4 
 
 
- 0.3 
 
 
DE 
 
 
Pulp, paper & paper products; publishing & printing 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
- 0.7 
 
 
2.8 
 
 
- 0.3 
 
 
2.7 
 
 
- 2.0 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
DF 
 
 
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
- 2.5 
 
 
- 4.3 
 
 
- 1.4 
 
 
- 0.8 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
- 0.4 
 
 
- 0.7 
 
 
DG 
 
 
Chemicals, chemical products and  man made fibres 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
- 10.8 
 
 
- 2.0 
 
 
- 3.6 
 
 
- 1.4 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
- 1.9 
 
 
DH 
 
 
Rubber and plastic products 
 
 
- 0.1 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
- 2.2 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
DI 
 
 
Other non - metallic mineral products 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
- 1.2 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
- 0.6 
 
 
- 0.7 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
DJ 
 
 
Basic metals and fabricated  metal products 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
- 4.5 
 
 
- 5.2 
 
 
- 1.2 
 
 
- 6.0 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
- 1.6 
 
 
DK 
 
 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
 
 
1.8 
 
 
- 7.1 
 
 
- 0.8 
 
 
- 2.5 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
- 8.6 
 
 
- 0.1 
 
 
- 2.4 
 
 
DL 
 
 
Electrical and optical equipment 
 
 
- 4.0 
 
 
6.2 
 
 
30.7 
 
 
2.7 
 
 
1.8 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
DM 
 
 
Transport equipment 
 
 
- 6.6 
 
 
2 .8 
 
 
6.9 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
12.8 
 
 
- 1.8 
 
 
3.1 
 
 
DN 
 
 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 
 
 
- 0.8 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
- 0.6 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
- 0.5 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
Total percentage rearranged 
 
 
1 
 
 12.2 
 
 
18.6 
 
 
38.6 
 
 
13.6 
 
 
14.2 
 
 
21.0 
 
 
9.3 
 
 
11.0 
 
 
1 
 
 
  Sum of the absolute values of the entries in the given column, divided by 2 . 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the WIIW data base 
 
 
Sectoral shifts in anufacturing industries 1989 - 2000, percentage point 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Sectoral shifts n manufacturing industries 1 -2000, ge point 
(based on c stant 1996 price dat ) 
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 Slovenia (9.3 percentage points) and Hungary (38.6) emerge as outliers. The 
small extent of structural change in Slovenia’s manufacturing industry is a surprise, 
since this country has shown the most balanced and solid output performance in the 
region since 1993. It is true, however, that Slovenia was also the most developed of the 
CEECs at the beginning of the period and may not have needed as much restructuring as 
the rest of the group (more details follow). Hungary’s spectacular shift is seemingly 
attributable to a single sector’s huge contribution (electrical and optical equipment)15. 
This raises the suspicion (also for the Hungarians and specialists of FDI) whether this 
shift is not inflated somehow. One might ask, for instance, whether it was not possible 
that the expansive activities in this sector originated in a few multinationals’ affiliates 
with a high proportion of ‘screwdriver’ operations (i.e. a large volume of [imported] 
intermediate products, a low share of domestic value added, and then again a high 
volume of exports). 
 To find out whether this suspicion holds up, in Table 5 we calculated the share 
of  manufacturing subsectors both in gross output and in gross value added for Hungary 
and for two additional developed candidate countries, the Czech Republic and Poland. 
We also included Ireland, an EU country which is known for the dominance of 
multinational operations in its leading manufacturing industries. As it turns out, 
Hungary, unlike the Czech Republic or Poland, indeed realizes relatively more gross 
output than value added in its leading industry (DL). This difference, however, is 
similar to the one that one finds in Ireland in the same leading industry (DL), and is not 
unlike the relation between gross output and value added in the table in the transport 
industries (DM) in each of the three CEECs. 
 Nevertheless, Hungary does have a special position among the CEEC-7 because 
the gross output of not only one or two subsectors of its manufacturing  have become 
‘inflated’ by a high proportion of ‘screwdriver operations’ (in other words, a high 
proportion of intermediate products), but that of the whole manufacturing industry. 
When we calculate the cumulative difference between the growth of gross output and 
gross value added in total manufacturing in the CEEC-7 for 1997-2000, our result 
shows that no country had as high a difference as Hungary: 33 per cent. The next 
countries in this series are the Czech Republic with 17 per cent, Slovakia (7 per cent) 
and Poland (6 per cent).   
                                                 
15
 One may note here that in this group of countries, before 1990, only Slovenia had developed 
without the access to cheap energy sources from the USSR, thus it had not built up a structure 
that later had to be corrected. Hungary, however, starting with 1980, operated a domestic price 
setting system in which producer prices of fuels and raw materials were calibrated to world 
market prices. This means that, following the demise of the CMEA, the pressure to restructuring 
due to the surge of prices of imported energy sources was also small in Hungary, although 
apparently not as small as in Slovenia (see Gács, 1994). 
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 Turning back to Figure 4 and Table 4 one can identify that the industry where 
most countries reduced their activity was the textile industry (DB), while the two 
industries that expanded most were electric and optical equipment (DL) and transport 
equipment (DM). The substantial reduction of activities in the production of machinery 
and equipment (DK) in the group of CEEC 7 was mostly attributable to the dramatic 
contraction of this industry in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 Havlik (2001) finds that one additional characteristic feature of this restructuring 
was that production specialization increased substantially in all the CEEC-7 in the 
1990s. 
 By using an indicator of structural shift16 one can investigate the evolution of 
sectoral rearrangements in time and compare structures in different countries with each 
other. Figure 5 shows the speed at which the structures of manufacturing industry 
(essentially points in a 14-dimensional vector space) moved away from their starting 
position in 1989 in CEEC-7. (This means that the respective value in the given year 
shows the distance of the structure in that year from the structure in 1989). The curves 
of the individual countries show an initial wave of structural shift that can be associated 
with the collapse of output in the early 1990s (passive restructuring), and a second wave 
starting around 1996-1997 which could be associated with active restructuring (see also 
                                                 
16
 The formula of this indicator is the following: ∑ −=
k
y
k
y
k
x
k shshshS )100/(*)( 2 , where 
x
ksh and 
y
ksh are shares in percent in the structural vector characterizing countries x and y, or the 
same country in years x and y, while k is the individual industry. The indicator can change 
between 0 and 100. From among the possible indicators of structural shift we adopted this 
formula from Landesmann (2000a) in order to be able to compare our results with the ones in 
his study. For alternative indicators see Gács (1989). 
 
 
 
Table 5: 
Comparison of distribution in gross manufacturing output and gross manufacturing value added in the respective subsectors 
     Czech Rep. 1999         Hungary 1999       Poland 1999         Ireland 1997 
Gross Gross value Gross Gross value Gross Gross value Gross Gross value 
output added output added output added output added 
% % % % % % % % 
DA  Food 17.2 14.4 16.9 13.6 23.4 19.1 25.0 20.3 
DB Textile 4.4 5.5 3.9 6.2 4.9 6.2 1.8 1.6 
DC Leather 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.1 0.1 
DD Wood 2.7 2.8 1.6 2.1 3.7 4.1 1.0 0.8 
DE Paper 4.7 4.7 4.6 5.3 6.5 7.5 10.0 15.0 
DF Petrol 2.8 1.1 5.9 8.4 4.7 2.6 0.0 0.0 
DG Chemical 6.7 6.5 6.7 8.6 6.9 7.2 19.5 28.6 
DH Rubber 4.3 4.9 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.2 1.9 1.8 
DI Mineral 6.4 9.0 3.1 4.4 5.2 6.8 2.1 2.3 
DJ Metal 15.9 14.8 8.3 8.3 10.9 10.8 2.8 2.3 
DK Machine 8.0 10.5 4.8 6.7 5.8 7.4 2.8 2.6 
DL Electrical 7.9 9.1 22.9 17.0 7.7 9.3 29.1 21.7 
DM Transport 14.3 11.5 15.5 11.9 10.1 7.4 1.6 1.3 
DN Other 3.9 4.2 1.7 2.3 4.7 5.2 2.2 1.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2000), CSO (2000) and WIIW data base 
Table 5: Comparison of distribution in gross manufacturing output and gross 
manufacturing value added in the respective subsectors 
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Landesmann 2000a). Hungary, Slovakia and Romania stand out as active in the new 
wave, while Slovenia’s and Poland’s steady closeness to the structure of 1989 is a 
surprise. After all, these are the countries that achieved the highest GDP by 2000 
compared to their pretransition level (114 per cent and 127 per cent, respectively); 
moreover Poland showed an exemplary expansion in its manufacturing output as well 
(achieved 146 per cent of the pretransition level). Given that the most relevant 
conditions were similar for all CEECs (collapse of former export markets, rapid 
liberalization of foreign trade), this contradiction can only be explained if we assume 
that in these two countries restructuring was carried out within the individual 
manufacturing subsectors of the manufacturing industry rather than across them. 
 
 
 The two waves of restructuring across manufacturing industries can be also 
detected in Figure 6 where we depicted the development of real GDP and 
manufacturing production on the left axis, and the development of structural change in 
manufacturing on the right axis. The presence of the second wave remains visible also 
in the case when, due to its extraordinarily strong restructuring in 1996-2000, we take 
Hungary out of the sample. 
 
 
Figure 5: Structural shifts in manufacturing production in CEEC 7 compared to 1989
(the vaue of the index of structural shifts)
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Figure 5:Str ctural shifts in anufactu ing production in CEEC7 
compared to 1989  (the value of the index of structural shifts) 
 16  
 
 Another approach to analyze the emerging new structure of manufacturing is to 
compare the structure of manufacturing within the group of CEECs, as well as to make 
comparison with the established structures in the more advanced market economies, in 
this case members of the EU. 
 In Table 6 the results of calculations of ‘distance’ between manufacturing 
structures are presented for the CEEC-7 and for 11 EU member countries (for the 
countries in the two blocks for which comparable data were available). Again the 
structural shift statistics were used, this time with some modification.17 Data for 1989 
and in constant prices were available only for the CEECs, while data for recent years 
and at current prices were available for both groups. 
 Table 6A shows that on the eve of transition the structure of manufacturing in 
the CEECs was quite balanced. The Czech Republic and Slovakia (as much as we can 
trust in the statistics that were reconstructed later) were close to each other, as was the 
group Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. By 2000 the structures  became more diverse, but 
mostly due to Hungary’s outlier position (see Table 6B). In fact, Hungary’s structure is 
so distant to all of the other CEECs that it was justified to calculate how homogenous 
the group is without Hungary. In the last column of Table 6B we find that the remaining 
six CEECs show as homogenous a structure in 2000 as they did in 1989. 
                                                 
17
 Since the mentioned indicator has the drawback of not being commutative (i.e. the distance 
from x to y is different from distance from y to x), in the calculations for structural differences 
between countries we calculated the distances both ways and used their average. 
 
 
Figure 6: Development of the GDP and manufacturing production (left axis) and the structural shift in 
manufacturing (right axis) in CEEC 7 (1989=100 and 0)
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Figure 6: Development of the GDP and manufacturing production (left axis) 
and the structural shift in manufacturing (right axis) in CEEC7  
(1989 = 100 and 0) 
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 Based on Table 6C, among the CEECs one group can be found within which 
structures are close to each other: ‘the trio’ of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
 
Table 6
A. Distance between manufacturing structures among CEECs, at constant prices, 1989
Average
Bulgaria Czech R. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Average without Hungary
Bulgaria 0.0 6.1 3.3 2.6 5.5 4.3 5.7 4.6 4.9
Czech R. 6.1 0.0 7.1 6.0 5.8 2.7 4.2 5.3 5.0
Hungary 3.3 7.1 0.0 3.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 4.8
Poland 2.6 6.0 3.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 5.2 4.3 4.6
Romania 5.5 5.8 5.1 5.0 0.0 5.5 6.3 5.5 5.6
Slovakia 4.3 2.7 5.2 4.1 5.5 0.0 4.0 4.3 4.1
Slovenia 5.7 4.2 5.3 5.2 6.3 4.0 0.0 5.1 5.1
Average 4.9 4.9
B. Distance between manufacturing structures among CEECs, at constant prices, 2000
Average
Bulgaria Czech R. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Average without Hungary
Bulgaria 0.0 6.9 16.7 5.1 4.0 8.1 6.3 7.8 6.1
Czech R. 6.9 0.0 13.1 3.6 5.8 3.7 2.0 5.8 4.4
Hungary 16.7 13.1 0.0 14.7 16.3 14.9 14.0 14.9
Poland 5.1 3.6 14.7 0.0 3.2 5.6 3.4 5.9 4.2
Romania 4.0 5.8 16.3 3.2 0.0 6.9 5.4 6.9 5.1
Slovakia 8.1 3.7 14.9 5.6 6.9 0.0 4.6 7.3 5.8
Slovenia 6.3 2.0 14.0 3.4 5.4 4.6 0.0 6.0 4.3
Average 7.8 5.0
C. Distance between manufacturing structures among CEECs, at current prices, 1999-2000
Bulgaria Czech R. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Average
Bulgaria 0.0 7.0 11.3 5.5 5.7 7.0 6.7 7.2
Czech R. 7.0 0.0 8.5 4.3 5.4 2.7 2.7 5.1
Hungary 11.3 8.5 0.0 9.5 11.6 8.7 8.4 9.7
Poland 5.5 4.3 9.5 0.0 6.8 6.2 4.8 6.2
Romania 5.7 5.4 11.6 6.8 0.0 5.1 6.1 6.8
Slovakia 7.0 2.7 8.7 6.2 5.1 0.0 3.8 5.6
Slovenia 6.7 2.7 8.4 4.8 6.1 3.8 0.0 5.4
Average 6.6
D. Distance between manufacturing structures among EU member countries, at current prices, 1996-1998 
Austria Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Sweden UK Average
Austria 0.0 5.8 6.4 4.4 7.8 17.6 2.7 5.2 4.3 4.0 2.7 6.1
Finland 5.8 0.0 8.8 8.1 11.3 17.3 7.3 8.8 8.7 5.0 6.4 8.7
France 6.4 8.8 0.0 3.7 11.8 19.3 6.4 8.5 7.0 4.8 5.5 8.2
Germany 4.4 8.1 3.7 0.0 9.7 18.9 4.4 6.8 4.8 3.6 3.5 6.8
Greece 7.8 11.3 11.8 9.7 0.0 17.2 7.4 5.5 5.8 10.9 7.1 9.4
Ireland 17.6 17.3 19.3 18.9 17.2 0.0 19.0 18.6 17.9 17.7 17.1 18.1
Italy 2.7 7.3 6.4 4.4 7.4 19.0 0.0 4.2 4.4 5.4 3.6 6.5
Port 5.2 8.8 8.5 6.8 5.5 18.6 4.2 0.0 4.3 7.7 4.6 7.4
Spain 4.3 8.7 7.0 4.8 5.8 17.9 4.4 4.3 0.0 6.4 3.0 6.6
Sweden 4.0 5.0 4.8 3.6 10.9 17.7 5.4 7.7 6.4 0.0 4.0 6.9
UK 2.7 6.4 5.5 3.5 7.1 17.1 3.6 4.6 3.0 4.0 0.0 5.7
Average 8.2
Source: own calculations on data from the WIIW data base and OECD (2000)
 - outlier, most distant from the rest in the group
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 Table 6D shows the distance between pairs of countries in the EU. This block 
shows a higher heterogeneity than the block of the CEECs. Clear outliers are Ireland, 
Greece and to some extent Finland. The closest small group within the 11 countries is 
‘the quintet’ of Austria, Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain. 
 The sizable (and not easy to comprehend) table that helps make understandable 
the closeness of structures between countries in the EU on the one hand and Eastern 
Europe on the other was put into the Appendix (Appendix Table 2). The main lessons 
from the table are summarized in Figure 7: In the structure of manufacturing, neither 
Hungary nor Bulgaria or Romania show a similarity to the structure of any country in 
the EU-11 (one exception is the closeness of Bulgaria’s structure to that of its neighbor 
Greece). Of the remaining CEECs the trio of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia 
shows a closeness to the quintet of Austria, Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain, while 
Poland falls closer to the Southern European countries of Spain and Portugal (as well as 
to the UK). The similarity of the EU quintet and the CEEC trio is due to the relatively 
high share of metallurgy (DJ) and transport equipment (DM), and the relatively low 
share of food production (DA), paper (DE) and the chemical industries (DG) in both 
groups. Poland and the two Southern countries show the characteristic feature of a 
relatively large share in food production (DA), manufacturing of wood (DD) and 
mineral products (DI), and a relatively modest share in chemical (DG), machine (DK) 
and electrical (DL) manufacturing.  
Our results, to some extent, contradict to those of Landesmann (2000a), who 
found that the manufacturing structure of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia is 
close to that of the group of Northern European countries (Belgium, France, Germany 
and the UK), while the structures of Bulgaria, Poland and Romania lie close to those of 
the south European EU members (Greece, Spain and Portugal). One of the reasons for 
this discrepancy may have been that Landesmann used constant price data while we 
used data at current prices. 
 There are many ways of characterizing certain industrial structures: one can 
show their typical factor intensity, the share of subsectors with typically dynamic and 
sluggish demand, the potential for productivity or unit labor cost gains, or other factors. 
In order to further characterize the manufacturing sectors that emerged in CEECs we 
decided to investigate the ‘cream’ of the manufacturing output, i.e. that part earmarked 
for exports to the European Union. Given that in 1999 the average share of 
manufacturing output that the CEECs exported to the EU was 33 per cent, this ‘cream’, 
in fact, contains quite a large part of the ‘cake’.18  
 For our analysis we selected a new framework, the so-called new WIFO 
taxonomy, which was theoretically elaborated and technically accomplished by Michael 
Peneder (Peneder 2001). This scheme groups individual industries at the NACE 3 level  
                                                 
18
 The export shares in gross output are the following for the individual countries: Bulgaria 31 
per cent, Czech Republic 36 per cent, Hungary 45 per cent, Poland 17 per cent, Romania 25 per 
cent, Slovak Republic 37 per cent, and Slovenia 39 per cent. 
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according to their typical combinations of factor inputs to reveal (1) exogenously given 
competitive advantages based on factor endowments, and (2) endogenously created 
advantages based on strategic investments in intangible assets such as marketing and 
innovation. This taxonomy comprises five mutually exclusive groupings: these are 
mainstream manufacturing, labor-intensive, capital-intensive, marketing-driven and 
research-driven industries. We are interested that what factor input combinations are 
typically used in the manufacturing exports of the CEECs and how they compare to 
combinations used in the export of the EU member countries.  
 Figures 8 and 9 show the results of our calculations in the form of distribution of 
exports to EU according to the mentioned classes of manufacturing industries. As 
expected, the exports of CEECs, as a group, are distinct from the exports of the EU 
member countries in many respects. CEEC exports are still characterized by very high 
ratios of labor intensive industries (in the case of Lithuania and Latvia these make up 
more than 70 per cent of exports), while research-driven industries represent a much 
smaller part than in the EU member countries. The high share of labor-intensive 
industries is certainly good for keeping the otherwise substantially reduced employment 
in manufacturing. However, it also indicates that productivity catching up will require 
massive intersectoral restructuring, since labor-intensive industries, as a rule, have small 
potential for productivity increases.19  
 The low share of research- and technology-intensive exports is all the more 
important because these exports in the EU show several times higher unit values than 
the other classes of export products (probably due to the greater opportunity they offer 
                                                 
19
 See European Commission (1999). 
Figure 7:  Distance in terms of manufacturing structures, 
1996-2000
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Figure 8: Distribution of CEEC exports to the EU by industries characterized by specific input 
combinations, 1999
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Figure 9: Distribution of exports of EU countries to the EU by industries characterized by specific 
input combinations, 1999
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Figure 8: Distribution of CEEC exports to the EU by industries 
characterized by specific input combinations, 1999 
Figure 9: Distrubution of exports of EU countries to the EU by 
industries characterized by specific input combinations, 1999 
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for vertical integration). Some candidate countries have managed to build up a sizeable 
research-driven export sector, particularly Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic (in 
this order); in fact these countries are also the ones that attracted the highest cumulated 
FDI per capita so far. Further research should establish how much the CEECs can, in 
fact, realize from the potentially high unit values.20 
 Marketing- (or advertising-) driven industries (made up mostly of food, 
detergents, cleaning articles, perfumes and other consumer products) again play much 
smaller role in the exports of the CEECs than in the EU (only the Scandinavian EU 
members show shares as low as the CEECs here). 
 Despite the high structural variation across the EU member countries, a strict 
comparison would find now only Hungary’s export structure close to the export 
structure of any EU member country. With a little more tolerance, however, we could 
say that in some additional candidate countries (such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) structures resemble the structure of certain EU member countries, notably 
those of Greece and Portugal. 
 
 
4. The utilization of the GDP: saving and investment habits 
 
The conventional wisdom about the desirable shifts on the utilization side of 
GDP in the candidate countries is more or less clear. 
 The communist period was characterized by a high level of domestic savings, 
which in some countries – particularly Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland – were 
complemented with external savings (through external borrowing).21 Investment ratios 
were high in an international comparison: data (albeit incomplete) show that in the 
period of 1980-1989 the candidate countries had an average gross investment ratio of 32 
per cent, while the average in the EU-15 was 22 per cent. In the late 1980s in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the stagnation of output coupled with a high investment ratio 
showed declining returns to investments. 
 After the start of transition, apart from the apparent shocks (of output decline, 
price inflation, emerging unemployment, etc.) the whole institutional background and 
incentive structure for decisions on consumption and savings changed due to the move 
from central planning to the market. Earlier, the majority of the decisions on savings 
and investment were made by the state or in the centralized hierarchy of the state based 
on certain dogmas and priorities of the system and formulated in the framework of 
                                                 
20
 In a more detailed analysis Havlik et al. (2001) found that Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia 
achieved unit values equal to EU levels in the research-driven sector. 
21
 Most attempts in the literature to prove that the high level of savings in the communist 
countries was associated with the disequilibrium in the consumer markets (i.e. forced savings) 
proved unsuccessful, although it is clear that part of the savings were associated with permanent 
shortages. For the earlier literature see Charemza and Davis (1989), for a more recent 
investigation see Denizer and Wolf (1998). 
 22  
mandatory planning (see Kornai 1992, chapter 9). In the evolving market system most 
of the decisions on consumption, savings and investment are to be made by the 
consumers and private firms based on, as it is assumed, the criteria prevailing in market 
economies, such as the intertemporal maximization of consumer utility, consumption 
smoothing, profit maximization, and the like. 
 It is natural that the evolution of the new system has taken time, and in the 
interim period various transitory criteria of savings and investment were applied in 
decisions. For instance, on the one hand, liberalization of markets and imports led to a 
euphoria of consumer purchases to meet pent-up demand. In addition, with opening new 
perspectives for reaching West European living standards, in principle future income 
and, accordingly, wealth and optimal consumption increases (see Burda and Wyplosz 
1997, p. 85). On the other hand, due to the emergence of high inflation, the decline in 
real incomes and the threat of unemployment, consumers were more likely to focus on 
their current situation. It was unlikely that in the hope of future incomes they would 
borrow; rather, they developed a habit of precautionary savings for pending bad days. 
The uncertainties of the first years of transition did not provide clear prospects of the 
enterprises either for savings or investments. To illustrate the rearrangements of savings 
in this transitory period, in Figure 10 we show the development of savings by sectors in 
Hungary. It is clear that in the first years of transition the corporate sector had hardly 
any savings. 
 
 
 
 One could expect that, following the early shocks of transition, as economic 
recovery evolved, savings would return to relatively high levels: recent theories of 
savings emphasize the growth of income and the income level as the determinants of 
 
Figure 10:  Hungary: Saving rates by sectors, and grosss national savings (percent of GDP)
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gross national savings at least as much, if not more, than the other way round (see 
Loayza et al. 1998a, 1998b, and Rodrik 1998). These higher savings rates would 
probably be lower than the pretransition rates. Some analysts, however, such as Sachs 
and Warner (1996), believe that without achieving national saving rates characteristic of 
the 'very fast growing economies' (basically the East Asian ‘tigers’ plus Chile and 
Mauritius), a fast catching up by the CEECs would be impossible.22 
 Beside high domestic savings one could expect that, due to anticipated higher 
returns to capital in the East European region, domestic resources would be 
complemented with increasing external savings, and the combination of these savings 
would be the base for higher investment rates necessary for higher growth. As the first 
six columns in Table 7 show, while some of these logical expectations were realized, 
some were not. Domestic savings in general did not show an upward adjustment in the 
second half of the 1990s in the group (the exceptions are Hungary and Bulgaria). 
Investments, however, picked up, basically based on the additional inflow of foreign 
savings reflected also in the export-import balance. The Czech Republic and Slovakia 
stand out as prominent in both saving and investment ratios, both in the middle and the 
late 1990s. This seems to indicate the continuation of a long-term tradition of thrift in 
these two countries. As for the source of these savings, UN ECE (2001) indicates that in 
the second half of 1990s in the Czech Republic about 89 per cent, in Slovakia 94 per 
cent of the domestic savings came from households and the corporate sector. 
 Only few studies analyze the determining factors of the variation of savings and 
investment ratios in the transition economies and, what is more, try to construct time 
series for the development of the stock of physical capital that could eventually be 
associated with the growth of output.23 The estimation of the development of the 
physical capital stock should involve, in addition to taking into account the new fixed 
capital formation, the estimation of the initial capital stock, the drastic depreciation of 
this stock at the beginning of the transition period, and the application of depreciation 
profiles to different parts of the physical capital during the 1990s. Since we do not have 
reliable cross-country data either for the initial capital stock or the mentioned 
depreciation coefficients, for an illustration for the investment efforts and the potential 
increment to gross physical capital we made a simple calculation: we calculated the 
average gross fixed investment shares for the 1990s and the cumulated additional gross 
fixed capital (i.e. with no depreciation applied). The cumulated gross fixed capital is 
expressed in terms of the starting (1989) GDP of each country, and its size reflects the 
combined effect of the development of fixed investment ratios and of the GDP.  The 
results are presented in Figure 11. The figure shows again the outstanding investment 
efforts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; in contrast, Latvia and Bulgaria could 
accumulate only moderate additional capacities, due both to their relatively low 
investment ratios and to the low level of output. 
 
                                                 
22
 The rates achieved by the 'very fast growing economies', however, are comparable to the rates 
of the communist economies earlier. 
 
23
 For the few studies see for instance Denizer and Wolf (1998), UN ECE (2001), Simon and 
Darvas (2000), Kovács (2001) and Dobrinsky (2001). 
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 In any economy, but especially in transition economies, one has to ask whether 
the domestic savings ended up in productive investments, and whether the investments 
were made in projects that eventually contributed to economic growth. The answers are 
not obvious. As emphasized by Benácek (2001) the persisting high investment shares in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia have to be qualified in the light of the high percent of 
bad loans in those countries: “a large part of the savings were used for the underpinning 
of privatization transfers by means of bank loans for unspecified acquisitions, instead of 
using them strictly for productive purposes, such as restructuring, R&D, new 
investments, training new skills, etc.” Data on bad loans in the last column of Table 7 
confirm this view and indicate that one has to be cautious in evaluating high or low 
saving and investment ratios in the CEECs. 
 From the point of view of catching up the crucial question is once certain 
investment ratios have been achieved, what contribution would the resulting additional 
physical capital make to the growth of output. The obvious tools to answer a question 
like this are growth models; however, due to lack of reliable and sufficiently long series 
of data there have been only very few attempts to perform such model estimations. In 
Figures12 and 13 we present the results of a recent growth accounting exercise carried 
out by Rumen Dobrinsky (2001) in the framework of IIASA’s research project 
‘Catching Up and Accession’. The estimation included the following steps: (a) 
establishing the data series for the primary distribution of income in the CEEC 
economies for the compensation of labor and capital, based on the SNA framework; (b) 
reconstruction of the missing time series for fixed capital stocks in the CEECs with the 
use of the so-called Perpetual Inventory Method; (c) calculation of the Solow residual, 
 
Figure 11:  Average Gross Fixed Investment Ratios for 1990-1999 (%, right scale) 
and Cumulated Gross Fixed Capital in 1999 (in % of GDP in 1989, left scale) 
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i.e. total factor productivity (TFP) with the application of the simple Solow growth 
function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Gross Domestic Savings, Gross Domestic Investments, Export-Import Balance and Bad Loans
(% of GDP)
                   1994-1995                 1998-1999 1995-1999
Savings Investment Exp-imp* Savings Investment Exp-imp* Bad loans
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) % of total loans
Bulgaria 12.4 12.6 -1.1 15.0 18.0 -4.5 13.4
Czech R. 29.6 31.9 -3.8 26.9 29.1 -1.6 29.1 **
Estonia 21.3 27.2 -9.5 19.5 27.0 -8.1 2.7 ***
Hungary 15.6 23.1 -3.9 24.7 29.3 -2.3 5.9
Latvia 20.9 18.4 -0.3 16.5 27.0 -12.2 13.8
Lithuania 15.4 21.6 -8.9 12.0 23.7 -11.1 20.4
Poland 21.1 18.7 2.3 20.8 26.7 -5.8 15.3
Romania 21.4 24.6 -3.9 15.2 20.7 -6.2 49.3 ****
Slovakia 28.7 25.2 3.3 26.5 34.0 -8.2 38.2
Slovenia 24.2 22.1 0.5 25.5 26.9 -2.8 12.3
Average 21.0 22.5 -2.5 20.2 26.2 -6.3 20.0
Memorandum item
EU 15 average 22.6 19.7 2.9 24.0 21.0 3.9
* Balance of exports and imports of goods and services
** Excludes loans on the books of Konsolidacni Banka, banks 
  in receivership and the loan of CSOB to Slovenska Inkasni.
*** Refers to provisions for non-collectible loans
**** Includes overdue loans and interest classified as doubtful and
    loss-making. Data for bad loans for Credit Bank between 
    1994 and 1996 and Dacia Felix Bank in 1997 are not included
Source: UN ECE (2001), WDI (2001) and EBRD (2000)
Table 7: Gross Domestic Savings, Gross Domestic Investments, Export-
Import Balance and Bad Loans 
 26  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Contribution of labor, capital and total factor productivity (TFP) to growth of GDP in the 
CEECs in the period 1995-1999, annual average rates, percent 
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Figure 13: Contribution of labor, capital and total factor productivity (TFP) to the growth of GDP in 
selected EU member states in the period 1995-1999, annual average rates, percent 
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 Figure 12 presents the results for 1995-1999, the first period in which we can 
speak about growth at all in the group of the CEECs, and in which there was a higher 
chance that the assumptions of the Solow model (profit maximizing behavior, perfect 
markets) were fulfilled in the candidate countries than earlier. The figure for the CEECs 
shows the interesting result that the recovery period of (most of) the CEECs was 
dominated by gains in TFP.24 The increases in TFP in 1995-1999 followed big drops in 
the preceding five years in most of the countries (not included in the figure); the 
exceptions were Hungary and Poland, which realized a TFP increase even in 1990-
1994. All in all, the strong role of TFP in the late 1990s shows that there have been 
large reserves for improvements in allocative efficiency and X-efficiency. This potential 
was realized to a large extent through industrial restructuring, privatization, improving 
corporate governance, establishing a sounder financial system, i.e. through means with 
relatively small contribution of additional fixed capital that one assumes to be 
associated more with improvements in technical efficiency. 
 The prominence of TFP in supporting growth in the CEECs in 1995-1999 was in 
sharp contrast to the pattern of sources of growth in the EU member countries the same 
period. In the EU the primary importance of TFP was rather an exception, while the 
dominance of the contribution by capital was the rule. The large discrepancy between 
the CEECs and the EU in terms of sources of growth (at least in this growth accounting 
framework) can indicate that even in the near future there will be opportunities for 
substantial gains in TFP without the requirement to increase the investment ratios to 
levels achieved in the pretransition period, or maintained in the ‘very fast growing 
economies’. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
The investigation of structural changes at the macro level did not, and could not, 
provide a coherent and clear picture about the current stage and future potential of real 
convergence of the candidate countries. Each sphere of the analysis, however, offered 
interesting lessons about various aspects of the catching up process. 
 The most important development on the production side of the GDP has been 
the substantial reduction of previously overdeveloped industrial activities on the one 
hand and the emancipation of service activities on the other. Expanding market services 
have played a crucial role in filling the void after central planning was abandoned, since 
                                                 
24
 One could suspect that the low contribution of the capital to growth was due either to too high 
depreciation rates applied in the reconstruction of the time series of the capital stock, or to the 
too low share of capital in the primary income distribution of the CEECs. In fact, none of these  
is the case: the applied depreciation rate (a uniform rate of 0.075 for the total economy) 
corresponds to international practice, while the share of capital in primary income, although it 
naturally varies across the countries, is even higher on average in the CEECs  than in the 
comparable EU member countries. 
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efficient market coordination, the working of the ‘invisible hand’, could not have 
developed without them. Although certain lines of services cannot avoid backlashes (for 
instance, no transition economy could escape one or two waves of banking crises and 
painful bank restructuring), there is evidence that the impact of services is deepening, 
this sector is contributing to and determining the production of value added at more 
stages than before. 
 While the shift in services was almost uniform across the CEECs, restructuring 
within manufacturing showed a wide variation across the candidate countries. 
Interestingly, the good performance in the phase of recovery of output was not 
necessarily associated with large structural shifts (at least not at the NACE 2-digit 
level). The current dominance of labor-intensive products in manufacturing, however, 
indicate that productivity catching up will necessitate further massive shifts across the 
subsectors in most of the candidate countries. Even if a large share of ‘screwdriver 
operations’ in the framework of multinational networks may distort the picture of 
manufacturing structures, we may acknowledge that the countries that attracted the 
largest part of FDI managed either to achieve high structural shifts in their 
manufacturing, or to develop subsectors with potentially high unit values, or both. 
 On the utilization side of GDP we have seen substantial fluctuations in the 
CEECs during the last decade. The expectations, however, that following stabilization 
and recovery, high domestic savings rates and relatively high domestic investment ratios 
would support the evolving real convergence process have been realized only in a few 
countries. Moreover, in some of these economies substantial proportions of domestic 
savings were wasted. This mixed development emphasizes the importance of utilizing 
foreign savings, particularly in the form of direct investment, when project selection, 
monitoring and governance are not determined by the still fragile domestic financial 
system. The programmed progress of the EU accession process is crucial both to 
increase the potential volume of foreign savings and to ensure that efficiency gains such 
as those that dominated the period of recovery in 1995-1999 continue to accompany the 
accumulation of physical capital. 
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Appendix: Table 1 
Cross-country regression calculations for the share of gross value added of services in GDP, 1988 and 1999 
For samples 
      including the transition economies                          excluding the transition economies 
1988 1999 1988 1999 
Dependent variable: share of gross value added in services to GDP 
                   (%) 
Independent variable 
ln (GDP per capita, at PPP, 6.804 9.03 7.87 9.04 
   in current international USD) 
t-statistic 7.58 11.59 10.33 11.64 
Constant -5.405 -21.51 -12.30 -20.79 
t-statistic -0.735 -3.314 -1.97 -3.23 
aR 2 0.31 0.53 0.49 0.58 
No. of observations 124 120 113 99 
Cook-Weisberg test 
for heteroscedasticity 
chi2 1.74 1.43 0.56 1.17 
Prob > chi2 0.1877 0.2314 0.4546 0.2802 
Method: Ordinary Least Squares 
Source: Own calculations on data from WDI (2001) 
Appendix 1 
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APPENDIX: Table 2
Distance of manufacturing structures between countries in the EU and the CEECs, at current prices (in 1996-1998 and 1999-2000, respectively) 
EU+CEEC EU CEEC
Austria Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Sweden UK Bulgaria Czech R. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Average Average Average
Austria 0.0 5.8 6.4 4.4 7.8 17.6 2.7 5.2 4.3 4.0 2.7 7.2 3.4 7.2 5.5 6.4 3.9 2.4 5.4 6.1 5.1
Finland 5.8 0.0 8.8 8.1 11.3 17.3 7.3 8.8 8.7 5.0 6.4 10.8 8.4 8.8 9.5 10.6 8.2 7.1 8.4 8.7 9.0
France 6.4 8.8 0.0 3.7 11.8 19.3 6.4 8.5 7.0 4.8 5.5 11.0 6.5 7.8 9.4 9.7 5.4 6.2 7.7 8.2 8.0
Germany 4.4 8.1 3.7 0.0 9.7 18.9 4.4 6.8 4.8 3.6 3.5 8.9 4.1 7.4 7.1 8.4 4.1 3.9 6.2 6.8 6.3
Greece 7.8 11.3 11.8 9.7 0.0 17.2 7.4 5.5 5.8 10.9 7.1 3.8 7.0 11.5 3.9 6.6 8.1 7.1 7.9 9.4 6.8
Ireland 17.6 17.3 19.3 18.9 17.2 0.0 19.0 18.6 17.9 17.7 17.1 18.7 18.8 14.1 17.0 20.3 19.8 18.2 17.1 18.1 18.1
Italy 2.7 7.3 6.4 4.4 7.4 19.0 0.0 4.2 4.4 5.4 3.6 6.5 3.6 8.8 5.9 5.6 3.7 1.8 5.6 6.5 5.1
Portugal 5.2 8.8 8.5 6.8 5.5 18.6 4.2 0.0 4.3 7.7 4.6 6.2 5.0 9.5 4.7 6.6 5.8 4.1 6.4 7.4 6.0
Spain 4.3 8.7 7.0 4.8 5.8 17.9 4.4 4.3 0.0 6.4 3.0 6.4 2.2 8.6 2.8 6.3 4.1 3.1 5.5 6.6 4.8
Sweden 4.0 5.0 4.8 3.6 10.9 17.7 5.4 7.7 6.4 0.0 4.0 10.2 5.7 6.4 8.2 9.5 5.4 5.0 6.7 6.9 7.2
UK 2.7 6.4 5.5 3.5 7.1 17.1 3.6 4.6 3.0 4.0 0.0 6.8 3.3 6.8 2.4 7.1 3.8 2.6 5.0 5.7 4.7
Bulgaria 7.2 10.8 11.0 8.9 3.8 18.7 6.5 6.2 6.4 10.2 6.8 0.0 7.0 11.3 5.5 5.7 7.0 6.7 7.7 9.6 7.2
Czech R. 3.4 8.4 6.5 4.1 7.0 18.8 3.6 5.0 2.2 5.7 3.3 7.0 0.0 8.5 4.3 5.4 2.7 2.7 5.5 6.8 5.1
Hungary 7.2 8.8 7.8 7.4 11.5 14.1 8.8 9.5 8.6 6.4 6.8 11.3 8.5 0.0 9.5 11.6 8.7 8.4 8.6 9.7 9.7
Poland 5.5 9.5 9.4 7.1 3.9 17.0 5.9 4.7 2.8 8.2 2.4 5.5 4.3 9.5 0.0 6.8 6.2 4.8 6.3 7.6 6.2
Romania 6.4 10.6 9.7 8.4 6.6 20.3 5.6 6.6 6.3 9.5 7.1 5.7 5.4 11.6 6.8 0.0 5.1 6.1 7.7 9.7 6.8
Slovakia 3.9 8.2 5.4 4.1 8.1 19.8 3.7 5.8 4.1 5.4 3.8 7.0 2.7 8.7 6.2 5.1 0.0 3.8 5.9 7.2 5.6
Slovenia 2.4 7.1 6.2 3.9 7.1 18.2 1.8 4.1 3.1 5.0 2.6 6.7 2.7 8.4 4.8 6.1 3.8 0.0 5.2 6.1 5.4
Average 7.2 8.2 7.1
EU 7.4 8.2 7.4
CEEC 6.7 8.1 6.6
Source: own calculations on data from the WIIW data base and OECD (2000)
